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Abstract— Platoons of autonomous vehicles are being inves-
tigated as a way to increase road capacity and fuel efficiency.
Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control (CACC) is one approach
to controlling platoons longitudinal dynamics, which requires
wireless communication between vehicles. In the present paper
we use a sliding mode observer to detect and estimate cyber-
attacks threatening such wireless communication. In particular
we prove stability of the observer and robustness of the de-
tection threshold in the case of event-triggered communication,
following a realistic Vehicle-to-Vehicle network protocol.
I. INTRODUCTION
Autonomous vehicle platoons and Cooperative Adaptive
Cruise Control (CACC) are topics that received significant
attention by researchers in recent years [1]–[6]. CACC
is a longitudinal cooperative control technique that allows
platoons, or strings, of autonomous vehicles to coordinate
themselves. The goal is to have vehicles in the platoon trav-
elling closer together than human drivers, or non-cooperative
control approaches like Adaptive Cruise Control, can. Ben-
efits of this lower inter-vehicle spacing include better fuel
efficiency and road utilization. Vehicles in a CACC platoon
measure relative position and velocity of the preceding
vehicle, and also communicate (see figure 1) in order to attain
string stability, which is an important property resulting in
dampening of velocity changes down the platoon [6].
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Fig. 1. CACC equipped string of vehicles. The V2V communication is
implemented wirelessly, and is subjected to a class of cyber attacks.
The reliance of CACC platoons on inter-vehicle wireless
communications, be it periodic or event-triggered [7]–[9],
may expose them to the same kind of threats as other
networked control systems or Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS),
such as Denial of Service (DoS), routing, replay and stealthy
data injection attacks (see [10], [11]). Indeed, vulnerabilities
of Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) networks to cyber attacks have
been investigated in [12]–[15]. While CACC can provide
limited robustness to network induced effects such as random
packet losses (see [16], [17]), the case of a malicious
attacker targeting the (V2V) network should be addressed
by dedicated detection and fault-tolerant control methods.
While the case of faults in autonomous vehicles forma-
tions was addressed in [18] and [19] with an observer-
based approach, few works dealt with cyber-attacks. [20]
considered the problem of designing a model based observer
for detecting DoS attacks, which were characterised as an
equivalent time delay in the communication network.
In this paper we are going to extend some preliminary
results presented by the authors in [21], where a Sliding-
Mode Observer (SMO) was introduced for estimating false
data injection attacks. The contribution of the paper is
twofold: we prove the stability of the SMO under event-
triggered communication and less restrictive assumptions on
measurement uncertainties, and we introduce robust adaptive
attack detection thresholds for such a scenario. In particular,
we will assume the vehicle platoon is using a realistic event-
triggered communication protocol based on the current ETSI-
ITS G5 V2V communication standard [22], [23].
The use of sliding mode observers for fault detection
was pioneered by [24] and developed further by [25], [26],
amongst others. By monitoring the so-called equivalent out-
put injection (EOI), this method allows to estimate actuator
and sensor faults or, as in [21] and the present case, a false
data injection attack. Previous results considered continuous
communication, and did not derive an adaptive detection
threshold guaranteed to be robust against uncertainties or
communication-induced effects. The literature on fault detec-
tion for event-triggered systems, instead, includes works such
as [27]–[29], which are concerned with the simultaneous de-
sign of the triggering condition and the fault detector, while
[30] addressed the case of asynchronous communication and
packet loss for fault detection of networked control systems.
While several works considered the case of event-triggered
sliding mode control, such as [31]–[34], the present approach
would be, to the best of the authors knowledge, the first
contribution considering sliding mode observers for fault,
or cyber-attack detection and estimation in systems where
event–triggered communication is present.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
Section II introduces event-triggered CACC for a vehicle
platoon and describes the attack and its effect on the platoon.
Section III presents the sliding mode observer and character-
izes its stability, and section IV presents the attack detection
threshold and provides theoretical results on its robustness.
Section V provides preliminary results on attack estimation.
In sections VI and VII, respectively, the simulation results,
and conclusion and future work are presented.
A. Notation
Throughout the paper, a notation such as xi will denote a
variable x pertaining to the i–th vehicle, while xi,(j) will
denote the j–th component of the vector xi.
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II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. Error Dynamics of a Platoon using CACC
In the present paper we will use the CACC formulation
in [6] and its extension to event triggered communication
introduced in [8], while the event-triggering condition will
follow [22], [23]. We will consider a string of m ∈ N
homogeneous vehicles (see Figure 1), each modeled as[
p˙i(t)
v˙i(t)
a˙i(t)
]
=
[
vi(t)
ai(t)
1
τ (ui(t)− ai(t))
]
, (1)
where pi(t), vi(t), ai(t) and ui(t) ∈ R are the position,
velocity, acceleration and the input of the i-th vehicle, re-
spectively; furthermore, τ represents the engine’s dynamics.
Each vehicle is assumed to measure its own local output yi ,
[pi vi ai]
> + ξi and, with its front radar, the relative output
yi,i−1 , [di ∆vi]>+ ηi, where di(t) , (pi−1(t)−pi(t)−L)
is the inter-vehicle distance, L is the length of each vehicle,
∆vi , vi−1 − vi is the relative velocity and ξi and ηi are
the measurement uncertainties affecting the vehicle sensors.
Assumption 1: For each i–th vehicle, the measurement
uncertainties ξi and ηi are unknown but they are upper
bounded by known quantities ξ¯i and η¯i, i.e. |ξi,(j)(t)| ≤
ξ¯i,(j)(t) and |ηi,(j)(t)| ≤ η¯i,(j)(t) for all j, and all t.
dr,i(t) = ri + hvi(t) , (2)
while making the relative velocity ∆vi tend to zero in steady
state. in eq. (2) ri and h are the desired distance at stand still,
and the time headway between the vehicles respectively. [6]
Let us introduce the position error ei(t) , di(t)− dr,i(t)
and its time derivative e˙i(t) = ∆vi−hai(t). In [6], a CACC
control law is initially proposed in ideal conditions, as the
solution to the following equation
u˙i(t) =
1
h
[−ui(t) + (kpei(t) + kde˙i(t)) + ui−1(t)] . (3)
As can be seen from Eq. (3), the local control law depends
on measured quantities, such as the relative position and
velocity, which will be corrupted by noise. Furthermore,
the control law depends on the intended acceleration of the
preceding vehicle, ui−1(t), which shall be received through
a wireless V2V communication network.
In this paper the presence of measurement uncertainties
and non-ideal communication are explicitly incorporated in
the control law giving
u˙i(t) =
1
h
[
−ui(t) +
(
kpeˆi(t) + kd ˆ˙ei(t)
)
+ u˜i−1(t)
]
, (4)
where eˆi , ei+ηi,(1)−hξi,(2), ˆ˙ei , e˙i+ηi,(2)−hξi,(3), and
u˜i−1(t) = ui−1(t) + ∆ui−1(t) is the last received value of
ui−1(t). ∆ui−1 will be further defined in subsection II-B.
By following similar steps as in [6] and [21], we can write
the i–th vehicle error dynamics, under control law (4), as
Ei :
{
x˙ei(t) = Aexei(t) +Beζi(t)
yei(t) = Cexei(t) +Deζi(t)
, (5)
where Ce = De and the following quantities were introduced
Ae ,
[
0 1 0
0 0 1
−kpτ −kdτ − 1τ
]
, Be ,
[
0 0 0
0 0 0
−kpτ −kdτ − 1τ
]
Ce ,
[
1 0
0 1
0 0
]>
, xei,
[
ei(t)
e˙i(t)
e¨i(t)
]
, ζi,
[
ηi,(1) − hξi,(2)
ηi,(2) − hξi,(3)
∆ui−1(t)
] (6)
The stability and performance of the error dynamics Ei and
the string-stability of the platoon have been analysed in [6]
and [8]. As the present paper is concerned with the design
of a cyber-attack detection and estimation scheme, and not
the event-triggered CACC control scheme itself, for well-
posedness we will require the following
Assumption 2: Control law ui (Eq. (4)) and triggering
condition σ (Eq. (8)) are chosen such that, without cyber-
attacks and when Assumption 1 holds, Ei is stable for each
vehicle i and string stability of the platoon is guaranteed.
B. Attack and communication-induced effects
In this paper, following [8], [22], [23], the transmission of
ui−1 is assumed to be event triggered. Furthermore a man-in-
the-middle attack on the transmitted ui−1 is considered. We
are not interested here in the actual implementation of the
attack, for this, one can refer to [12]–[15]. For the observer,
the effects of communication, ∆ui−1,C(t), and the attack,
φi(t), will be combined in ∆ui−1(t) = ∆ui−1,C(t) +φi(t).
The event-triggered communication causes a variable de-
lay in the signal received by car i, defined as
τ0 = 0, τl+1 , inf {t ≥ τl : σ = 1} , (7)
where τl is the last transmission time, and σ is a triggering
condition based on the local measurements, yi−1, in car i−1:
σ , (t− τl ≥ TH ∨ (t− τl > TL∧
∃j = {1, 2} : |yi−1,(j)(τl)− yi−1,(j)(t)| ≥ ∆yL,(j))).
(8)
Here TL, TH and ∆yL ∈ R2 are user-designed parameters
that define, respectively, the minimum and maximum inter-
triggering times, and the threshold for communication.
In summary, communication is triggered on changes in
local measurements of car i−1 since the last communication.
This is combined with a minimum and maximum inter-
triggering time. The error introduced by the event-triggered
communication is denoted by ∆ui−1,C(t).
III. SLIDING MODE OBSERVER
In this section a Sliding Mode Observer (SMO) for the
dynamics Ei in eq. (5) is presented. To this end, first the
change of variables z1,i =
[
xei,(1)
xei,(2)
]
, ζ1,i =
[
ζi,(1)
ζi,(2)
]
, z2,i =
xei,(3), b = − 1τ is performed in order to separate the
measured and unknown states, giving:[
z˙1,i
z˙2,i
]
=
[
A11 A12
A21 A22
] [
z1,i
z2,i
]
+
[
0
A21ζ1,i + b∆ui−1
]
, (9)
yei = z1,i + ζ1,i. (10)
An observer design is presented, in eqs. (11) and (12), to
make the states slide along y,i(t) = 0 even in the presence
of noise-, communication- and attack-induced effects.[
ˆ˙z1,i
ˆ˙z2,i
]
=
[
A11 A12
A21 A22
] [
zˆ1,i
zˆ2,i
]
−
[
νi
0
]
(11)
νi(t) = (A11 + P )y,i(t) +Misgn(y,i(t)) (12)
Here Mi is a positive constant, and P ∈ R2×2 is a positive
definite matrix. Both are chosen to they verify the hypothesis
of Theorem 1, to guarantee the SMO stability. The observer
error dynamics can be written as in eqs. (13), (14).
1,i(t) = zˆ1,i(t)− z1,i(t)
2,i(t) = zˆ2,i(t)− z2,i(t)
y,i(t) = zˆ1,i(t)− (z1,i(t) + ζ1,i) = 1,i(t)− ζ1,i
(13)
˙i(t) =
[
A11 A12
A21 A22
]
i(t)−
[
νi(t)
A21ζ1,i(t) + b∆ui−1(t)
]
(14)
Theorem 1: 1,i(t), under the observer dynamics in (14),
can be bounded by ¯1 = ζ¯ if Mi > |A12¯2,i|+
∣∣A11ζ¯∣∣.
Proof: This proof will only consider the upper bound of
1,i(t), the lower bound can be proved in a similar manner. It
will be proven that if 1,i > ζ¯, then ˙1,i < 0. This is sufficient
to prove ζ¯ ≥ 1,i ∀ t. First note that 1,i > ζ¯ implies y,i > 0,
so the first row of eq. (14) can be rewritten to
˙1,i = P (ζ1,i − 1,i) +A11ζ1,i +A122,i −Mi (15)
Substituting the condition on Mi gives
˙1,i <P (ζ1,i − 1,i) + (A11ζ1,i − |A11ζ¯|)
+ (A122,i − |A12¯2,i|) ≤ 0 (16)
ζ¯, ¯2,i and other bounds are proven in the appendix.
In this paper, as in [24] and subsequent works on SMO-
based fault estimation, the EOI, derived from νi, will be
used for estimating attacks [24]. The EOI used here will be
obtained from the filter in eq. (17) [35].
νi,fil =
K
s+K
νi , (17)
where K > 0 is a design constant and s is the Laplace
domain complex variable.
IV. ATTACK DETECTION THRESHOLDS
As a novel contribution, we are introducing two pairs of
robust attack detection thresholds on νi,fil, which are guar-
anteed against false alarms, even in the presence of mea-
surement uncertainties and event-triggered communication.
Each pair will comprise an upper and a lower bound on the
values of νi,fil in non-attacked conditions. The two pairs
are termed One-Switch-Ahead (OSA) and Multiple-Switches-
Ahead (MSA) thresholds, for reasons that will be apparent
in next sections. For the sake of clarity, in Subsections IV-A
and IV-B we will assume there is no event-triggered com-
munication, i.e. ∆ui−1,C(t) = 0. The effects of its presence
on the thresholds will be illustrated in Subsection IV-C.
For the sake of notation, we will assume that the SMO is
initialized at time t0, and that sgn(y,i(t0)) = 1. This means
that between t0 and the next switch at t1, and all following
odd intervals [t2k t2k+1], with k ∈ N, the discontinuous
term νi and y,i(t) are positive, νi,fil will be increasing, and
1,i(t) will be decreasing. This is also shown in Figure 2.
Furthermore νi,fil will be initialised at νi,fil(t0) = 0 and we
will denote a threshold value calculated at tk by ν¯i,fil(tk).
For brevity, we will derive only the upper bound of each
threshold, which is of interest in the odd time intervals, as the
lower bounds and the behaviour during even time intervals
can be obtained via similar reasoning.
A. One-Switch-Ahead (OSA) Threshold
Let us consider the behaviour of νi,fil during the odd
interval, [t2k t2k+1] (see Figure 2a). By introducing, in eq.
(18), the upper bound ν¯ on νi, the time domain solution to
(17) can be upper bounded during the interval as in eq. (19).
ν¯ =
∣∣(A11 + P )(¯1 + ζ¯)∣∣+Mi (18)
νi,fil(t) ≤ e−K(t−t2k)νi,fil(t2k) + (1− e−K(t−t2k))ν¯ (19)
Remark 1: The right-hand side of eq. (19) is an upper
bound for νi,fil(t). However, it can be easily proved that
the inequality in eq. (19) will also hold in case of an attack.
Therefore, it is not a valid threshold for attack detection.
Next, in eq. (19), the hypothetical maximum time between
switches t¯ = max(t2k+1 − t2k) can be defined as an upper
bound for t. It will be shown in the following that this bound
can be exceeded in case of an attack, and therefore eq. 20
is a valid threshold for attack detection.
ν¯i,fil,OSA(t2k) = e
−Kt¯νi,fil(t2k) + (1− e−Kt¯)ν¯ , (20)
t¯ corresponds to the longest time for which y,i = 1,i −
ζ1,i can stay positive. This is the case when 1,i decreases
from its maximum value, ¯1, to its minimum value, −¯1,
with a minimum rate ˙1 = min(|˙1,i|). Note that, for this to
happen, ζ1,i < 1,i during the whole time. This is visualised
in Figure 2b and results in the following expression for t¯
t¯ =
2¯1
˙1
(21)
The bounds, ¯1, ˙1, and ζ¯ are derived in theorem 1, Appen-
dices A and C respectively, and shown in eqs. (22)-(24).
¯1 = ζ¯ =
[
η¯i,(1) + hξ¯i,(2)
η¯i,(2) + hξ¯i,(3)
]
(22)
˙1 = − |A12¯2,i|+Mi (23)
¯2,i = 2,i,0e
A22t − 2A21ζ¯ − b∆ui−1
A22
(24)
One can see in eq. 24 that ¯2,i depends on the attack. The
threshold is designed assuming no attack, so ∆ui−1 = 0.
Therefore, it is easy to check that if there is an attack, 2,i
can become bigger than ¯2,i (with ∆ui−1 = 0). Therefore
eq. 20 is a valid threshold for attack detection.
At t2(k+1) this threshold needs to be recalculated using a
new initial value of νi,fil(t2(k+1)), as illustrated in Figure 2.
This re-initialisation on the signal the threshold is attempting
to bound leads to inconsistent detection. Even though an
attack can cause detection between recalculations, it is also
dependent on the noise behaviour. As before, ζ1,i < 1,i
needs to hold during t¯ for the threshold to be reached, and
even though this chance is non-zero in case of an attack, in
every period [t2k t2k+1] there is a large chance an attack
is not detected. Therefore in the next section a threshold is
designed that is not dependent on νi,fil.
B. Multiple-Switches-Ahead (MSA) Threshold
The MSA threshold is based on the possible behaviour of νfil
over more than one switch ahead in time, after a hypothetical
occurrence of the worst case behaviour considered for the
OSA threshold.
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Fig. 2. A graphical illustration of the OSA and MSA threshold compu-
tations for the first three switching periods of the SMO. a) The EOI, the
OSA and the MSA thresholds are drawn with solid lines, while the terms in
eqs. (19) and (25) is drawn with dashed lines b) t¯ and t+ are hypothetical
maxima calculated at t0 and t2 respectively, and t− is a measured time.
The behaviour of 1,i is that of the worst case for each time period. These
worst cases are used in calculating the thresholds.
Right before the hypothetical OSA switch at t2k+1, 1,i =
ζ1,i = −ζ¯. At this moment there is a guaranteed switch, and
sign(y,i) = −1, ˙1,i > 0, and 1,i will increase during a
period lasting t− = t2(k+1) − t2k+1. At t2(k+1), there will
be another switch, making 1,i decreasing over a hypothetical
period t+. Figure 2b shows this behaviour for k = 0.
The MSA threshold considers the largest value that the
upper bound ν¯i,fil(t2(k+1)) could attain, starting from a
previously computed upper bound ν¯i,fil(t2k), after a known
period t− and a hypothetical period t+. This is shown in eq.
(25), where ν = − ∣∣(A11 + P )(¯1 + ζ¯)∣∣+Mi.
ν¯i,fil,MSA(t2(k+1)) = e
−Kt+(e−Kt− ν¯i,fil(t2k)
− (1− e−Kt−)ν) + (1− e−Kt+)ν¯
(25)
One can see from eq. (25) that ν¯i,fil,MSA is maximal for a
big t+. This is the case if ˙1,i = ¯˙1,i during t− and ˙1,i =
−˙1,i during t+. As t− is known, the maximum value of
1,i that can be reached in this time can be calculated as
1,i(t2k+1 + t−) = −ζ¯ + ¯˙1,it−. The maximum t+ can then
be expressed in terms of t− as in eq. (26). Here ¯˙1,i is defined
in Appendix A and stated in eq. (27).
t+ =
1,i(t2k+1 + t−)−−ζ¯
˙1,i
=
¯˙1,i
˙1,i
t− (26)
¯˙1 =
∣∣P (ζ¯ + ¯1)∣∣+ |A12¯2,i|+ ∣∣A11ζ¯∣∣+Mi (27)
Finally, the threshold that is used to detect an attack is
defined as in eq. (28). As both thresholds are guaranteed to
have no false attack detection, the combined threshold will
also guarantee this. Furthermore by taking the minimum of
both thresholds, the threshold is made less conservative:
ν¯i,fil(t2k) = min(ν¯i,fil,OSA(t2k), ν¯i,fil,MSA(t2k)). (28)
Theorem 2: ν¯i,fil only depends on νi,fil when it will
result in a lower threshold then if it doesn’t depend on νi,fil.
Proof: If ν¯i,fil(t2k) = ν¯i,fil,MSA(t2k) the threshold
will not be dependent on νi,fil. At every t2(k+1), except t2,
a new threshold will be calculated that is only dependent on
ν¯i,fil,MSA(t2k). At t2 no previous ν¯i,fil,MSA is available,
so ν¯i,fil,OSA(t0) is used. In general ν¯i,fil,OSA(t2k) is de-
pendent on νi,fil(t2k), however ν¯i,fil,OSA(t0) is dependent
on νi,fil(t0), which is defined to be 0. This can be done as
νi,fil is the result of a first order filter that can be initialised.
If ν¯i,fil(t2k) = min(ν¯i,fil,OSA(t2k), ν¯i,fil,MSA(t2k)),
ν¯i,fil(t2k) will be calculated based on ν¯i,fil,MSA(t2(k−1))
or a lower ν¯i,fil,OSA(t2(k−1)). Furthermore, ν¯i,fil,OSA(t2k)
will only become the threshold if it is lower then the
ν¯i,fil,MSA(t2k). These statements prove the theorem.
C. Threshold for Event Triggered Communication
In case of event triggered communication, ∆ui−1 includes
both the attack φi, and the communication-induced effect
∆uC,i−1 as defined in Section II-B. Therefore, without modi-
fications, the observer may falsely detect the communication-
induced effect as a cyber attack. The proposed modification
to the threshold will prevent this.
The difference between an attack and the event-triggered
communication error is that the first will start occurring at
communication times τl, while the latter will become zero
at such times, as an updated value ui−1 is received.
Just like the attack, the communication error affects the
observer through the dynamics of 2,i, and thus the threshold
through ¯2,i (derived in appendix B and stated in eq. 24).
This means that for the modified threshold, the increase in
¯2,i due to ∆uC,i−1 should be taken into account.
The exact ∆uC,i−1 is not known, however, a worst case
scenario exists, assuming there are no local maximums in
ui−1(t) between communications. This worst case is when
the maximum communication error ∆u¯C,i−1 , u˜i−1(τl) −
u˜i−1(τl−1) occurs constantly since the last communication.
This scenario is implemented by computing all the terms
needed for the threshold, using ¯2,i where ∆ui−1 = ∆u¯C,i−1
for every t2k in the period [τl−1 τl]. These calculations can
only be done retroactively, when a communication is received
at τl. This means that at τl the OSA and MSA thresholds
need to be calculated for every t2k in the period [τl−1 τl].
V. ATTACK ESTIMATE
In this section some preliminary results will be introduced
toward the goal of estimating the attack term φ. The method
proposed here, is based on [21]. This approach is valid
only for the case without measurement uncertainty and with
continuous observer dynamics. However, in the simulations
of section VI it will be shown that the estimate is also
accurate without these assumptions.
First note that without measurement uncertainty 1,i =
¯1 = ζ¯ = [0 0]
>, and for continuous observer dynamics
this implies ˙1,i = ¯˙1 = [0 0]>. Considering the new ideal
observer error dynamics, shown in eq. (29), a relation can
be found between ∆ui−1(t) and νi. Assuming ∆ui−1(t) is
piecewise constant, the differential equation in the last row
of eq. (29) can be solved to get eq. (30). Substituting this
solution in the first row of eq. (29), gives eq. (31).[
0
˙2,i(t)
]
=
[
A11 A12
A21 A22
] [
0
2,i(t)
]
−
[
νi(t)
b∆ui−1(t)
]
(29)
2,i
t→∞
= A−122 b∆ui−1(t) (30)
νi(t) = A122,i(t) = A12A
−1
22 b∆ui−1(t) (31)
From this, the estimate for ∆ui−1(t) can be expressed as in
eq. (32). Here + indicates the pseudo inverse. Furthermore,
as νi is a discontinuous switching term, the EOI νi,fil will
be used to estimate ∆ui−1 [24].
∆uˆi−1(t) = b−1A22A+12νi,fil(t) (32)
VI. SIMULATION RESULT
A CACC-controlled platoon of three vehicles using event
triggered communication, equipped with the sliding mode
observer presented in this paper, is implemented in Mat-
lab/Simulink. The parameters used in the simulation are
shown in tables I and II. Here the uncertainties are imple-
mented as zero–mean Gaussian white noise, with standard
deviations σηi and σξi . The simulation scenario considered
is shown in Figure 3. Results are shown for the same scenario
with continuous communication in Figure 4 and with event
triggered communication in Figure 5.
Variable Value
[unit]
Car τ 0.1 [−]
Noise σηi 0.05 [−]
σξi 0.05 [−]
Network
TL 0.1 [s]
TH 1 [s]
∆yL,(1) 4 [m]
∆yL,(2) 0.5 [m/s]
Sim. frequency 1000 [Hz]
TABLE I
SIMULATION PARAMETERS
Variable Value
[unit]
CACC
kp 0.2 [−]
kd 0.7 [−]
h 0.7 [s]
r 1.5 [m]
Observer
P 02×2 [−]
Mi 20 [−]
K 2 [−]
Threshold
2,i,0 10 [m/s
2]
η¯i 2σηi [−]
ξ¯i 2σξi [−]
TABLE II
DESIGN PARAMETERS
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Fig. 3. Simulation Scenario for attack on communication between car 1
and 2.
The first thing to be noticed in both cases, is the absence
of false alarms. Note that the event-triggered threshold in
figure 5 is only valid at triggering times, indicated with a ∗
marker.
The detection delays in these scenarios are 0.23 [s] and
0.6 [s], for the Continuous and Event triggered communica-
tion respectively. This detection time is scenario specific and
depends on many parameters, including the attack and noise
magnitudes, and the observer design parameters.
In figure 5 two peaks can be seen around 2 and 12[s].
These peaks are caused by the delay in the event triggerred
communication. An acceleration is initiated by vehicle 1 at
2.01 [s], while the first communication to vehicle 2 is at
2.4 [s]. During this time there is a nonzero ∆ui−1,C , which
the observer will start to estimate.
The attack is introduced at 4.01 [s], also asynchronous
with the communication, this however has no effect on the
observer, as car 2 and the observer will only be affected by
to the attack after it has received a communication.
Lastly, note that the threshold converges to a steady state
value around ±0.35, which means that for this scenario all
attacks bigger than this will be detected.
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Fig. 4. Attack estimation by car 2, continuous communication
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Fig. 5. Attack estimation by car 2, event-triggered communication
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper a cyber attack detection and estimation al-
gorithm is presented for a platoon of vehicles using a
Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control (CACC) algorithm and
a realistic, event-triggered Vehicle to Vehicle communication
protocol based on the ETSI ITS G5 standard. A man-in-the-
middle error injection attack is considered on the transmitted
intended acceleration of the preceding vehicle, ∆ui−1.
A detection and estimation approach was proposed, based
on the so-called Equivalent Output Injection signal of a
Sliding Mode Observer (SMO). This is combined with an
adaptive threshold that is robust against false detection.
The main contribution of this paper is the design of a ro-
bust attack detection threshold which incorporates the effects
of sensor noise and communication errors. This is done by
combining the One-Switch-Ahead and the Multiple-Switches-
Ahead thresholds. A second theoretical result was provided
regarding the stability of the SMO under measurement
uncertainties and event-triggered communication. Finally, a
preliminary result is proposed that allows to estimate the
amplitude of the cyber-attack, under ideal conditions. Simu-
lation results verified the expected behaviour and robustness
of the proposed solution, and showed that attack estimation
could be attained in practice also under non-ideal conditions.
In future work, we would like to derive theoretical results
on the attack estimation, which are also valid in non-ideal
conditions, and extend the approach to the case of more
general (non-)linear dynamical systems.
APPENDIX
A. Upper and Lower bound for ˙1,i
¯˙1,i is defined as max(|˙1,i|) and ˙1,i = min(|˙1,i|), they can
be constructed by substituting the upper and lower bounds of
all terms, as presented in eqs. (33)-(35), into eq. (15). This
gives eqs. (36) and (37) as expressions for the bounds. Only
the upper bound on A11ζ1,i in eq. (35) is non-trivial and will
be proved in theorem 3.
−|P (¯1 + ζ¯)| ≤ −P (1,i − ζ1,i) ≤ 0 (33)
− |A12¯2,i| ≤ A122,i ≤ |A12¯2,i| (34)
− ∣∣A11ζ¯∣∣ ≤ A11ζ1,i ≤ 0 (35)
˙1,i = − |A12¯2,i|+Mi (36)
¯˙1,i = |P (¯1,i + ζ¯)|+ |A12¯2,i|+
∣∣A11ζ¯∣∣+Mi (37)
Theorem 3: Averaged over a maximum dwell time sce-
nario (equations (21) and (26)), the effect of A11ζ1,i on ˙1,i
can only be negative.
Proof: In this scenario, for 1,i − ζ1,i > 0, 1,i is
monotonically decreasing from an upper bound lesser or
equal to ζ¯ to the lower bound −ζ¯. As A11 is a positive
definite matrix, the effect of A111,i on ˙1,i, averaged over
the maximum dwell time scenario, will be non-positive. As
ζ1,i < 1,i, the effect of A11ζ1,i on ˙1,i will be negative.
B. Upper bound for 2,i
By taking the second row of eq. (14), and bounding
A21(1,i − ζ1,i) <
∣∣A21(¯1 + ζ¯)∣∣ we obtain the differential
inequality in eq. (38).
˙2,i <
∣∣A21(¯1 + ζ¯)∣∣+A222,i − b∆ui−1 (38)
Using lemma 1.1.1 in [36], this gives the expression for ¯2,i
in eq. (39). Here ∆ui−1 is assumed to be piecewise constant.
2,i ≤ ¯2,i = 2,i,0eA22t −
∣∣A21(¯1,i + ζ¯)∣∣− b∆ui−1
A22
(39)
C. Upper bound for ζ1,i
Looking at the definition of ζ1,i in equations (6) and (9),
its bound can be expressed in terms of the bounds on the
individual noise terms (defined in assumption 1) as
ζ¯ =
[
η¯i,(1) + hξ¯i,(2)
η¯i,(2) + hξ¯i,(3)
]
(40)
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